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JANUARY 1, 1935
"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and great
cases but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass by because
they did not deal with the Co'nstitution, or a telephone company, yet which have in
them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore some profound interstitial change
in the very tissue of the law."-Mr. Justice Holmes, Collected Legal Essays, p. 269.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
WILLS-EFFECT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE EXERTED IN THE PROCURE-
MENT OF ONE LEGACY ONLY. McCarthy v. Fidelity National Bank.,
This was a suit to contest a will. A demurrer to the petition was sustained in the
lower court, and plaintiff, having refused to plead further, final judgment was en-
tered, upholding the will. The petition alleged that all of the provisions except a be-
quest to one Kane expressed the true will of the testatrix; that Kane's legacy was pro-
cured by undue influence; and that the residuary legatees had assigned to the plaintiff
any interest they might have in any addition to the residuary estate caused by the re-
jection of Kane's legacy. The prayer of the petition was that an issue be made up
whether the instrument constituted the last will of the deceased and that same be de-
clared as not her will. The trial court construed the petition as seeking to set aside
Kane's legacy only, leaving the remainder of the will to stand as such, and sustained
the demurrer to the petition on the ground that an action based upon such a petition
was not one to contest a will within the meaning of Section 525, R. S. Mo. (1919).
The Supreme Court, on appeal, affirmed the judgment of the trial court, taking the
position that the only issue before the court in a suit to contest a will is the issue wheth-
1. 30 S. W. (2d) 19 (1930).
2. "Since our statute (section 525, Rev. St.
1919) requires that, in a will contest case, an
issue shall be made up whether the writing :)ro-
duced be the will of the testator or not; the
writing so produced must be shown to be the
testator's will in its entirety or it is not his will
at all. \hen there is undue influence on the
part of one legatee, which results in a provi-
sion of the purported will beneficial to said
legatee, such undue influence vitiates the entire
will and renders it invalid in its provisions as to
other beneficiaries, although they did not par-
ticipate in bringing undue influence to hear upon
the testator." McCarthy v. Fidelity National
Bank & Trust Co. 30 S. W. (2) 19 (1930).
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er the instrument presented for probate, in its entirety, is or is not the last will of the
testator.2 The case, therefore, raises the question whether undue influence in the pro-
curement of one legacy only avoids the entire will.
Comment is directed to this decision because the problem which the case presents
has never before been specifically presented and decided by a Missouri court, and be-
cause the decision is contra to what has been generally regarded as the common law
rule, namely, that undue influence by one legatee does not vitiate the entire will unless
the entire will is the product of undue influence 3.
It will be noted that the provision of the Missouri Statute, " that an issue shall be
made up whether the writing produced be the will of the testator" applies in terms
only to a suit to contest the will. It may be helpful to inquire whether in the original
probate proceeding undue influence affecting part of a will only results in a denial of
probate to the instrument in its entirety. When an instrument is presented for probate,
it is the function of the probate court to determine (a) whether the instrument is tes-
tamentary in character, (b) whether it was executed with testamentary intent, (c) by
a competent testator, (d) pursuant to and in compliance with the formalities required
by law, (e) uninbuenced by fraud, and (f) whether the will, if valid as such, has been
revoked. The general rule is that the legal construction and effect of the various
clauses of the will are not in issue in' the probate proceeding4 . In the main, the Mis-
souri decisions are in accord 5 . One Missouri case 6 has declared that where a will is
properly executed and proved, it must be admitted to probate, though it contains not a
single provision capable of execution or valid under the law.
Undue influence bears upon the issue of testamentary intent . . . If the entire
will was procured by undue influence, the testator intended no part to be his will, and
it should not be probated. If only one legacy was procured by undue influence, that
legacy was not intended as a part of the will, and is not entitled to probate; but the
testator intended the remainder of the instrument to be his will, and it seems that the
remainder should be probated. Moreover, it does not seem consistent with the princi-
ples of justice that innocent legatees ought to be punished indiscriminately with those
who were guilty of undue influence. However, it must be admitted as stated by one
3. Florey Exrs. v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241 (1854);
Lyons v. Campbell, 88 Ala. 462, 7 So. 250
(1889); Eastis v. Montgomery, 93 Ala. 293, 9
So. 311 (1890); Henry et al v. Hall, 106 Ala.
84, 17 So. 187 (1894); Councill v. Mayhew, 172
Ala. 295, 55 So. 314 (1911); Zeigler v. Coffin,
219 Ala. 586, 123 So. 22, 63 A. L. R. 942
(1929); Snodgrass v. Smith, 42 Colo. 60, 94
Pac. 312 (1908); Appeal of Harrison, 48 Conn.
202 (1880); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Bailey,
202 Mass. 283, 88 N. E. 898 (1909); Petition
of McGuire; In re McCaffrey's Will, 173 N. Y.
S. 392, 105 Misc. of ep. 433 (1918); In re Kol-
ler's Estate, 116 Neb. 764, 219 N. V. 4 (1928);
Trimlestown v. D'Alton, 1 Dow & Clark 85
(1827); Page, \Wills (2d ed. 1916) 342; see also
Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 477, 487, 15 S. W. 618
(1890); Morris v. Stokes, 21 Ga. 552, 569 (1857):
Ogden- v. Greenleaf, 143 Mass. 349, 9 N. E.
745 (1887); Black v. Smith, 58 N. D. 109, 224
N. W. 915 (1929); Steadman v. Steadman, 10
Sadler (Pa.) 539, 14 At. 406 (1888).
4. Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 86 N. W.
959 (1900).
5. Kenrick v. Cole, 61 Mo. 572 (1876).
(Proceeding to establish a clause of a will,
which clause had been stricken out of the pro-
bate as void, it being a bequest which was for-
bidden by the state constitution, the court de-
clared in affirming a judgment against the
clause: "Redfield says that it is customary, in
the English practice, to exclude portions of the
will from probate when they do not legitimately
belong to the instrument. As, for instance,
where they are illegal or fraudulent; and he is
of the opinion that there is no reason why
the same course should not be pursued here".)
Contra: Cox v. Cox, 101 Mo. 168, 13 S. W.
1055 (1890), See Southworth v. Soulsworth,
173 Mo. 59, 73 S. W. 129 (1903).
6. Cox v. Cox, supra note 5.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
writer 7 that it is not commonly practicable to separate the valid and the invalid clauses,
for undue influence is usually found to have permeated the whole disposition and thus
defeated the testamentary intent of the testator. Of course if the entire will is pro-
cured by undue influence, though exerted only by one legatee, no part of the will is en-
titled to probate. Thus it has been unformly held that when the execution of the will,
as distinguished from any particular provision or provisions, is procured by undue in-
fluence exercised by one of the legatees, the whole will must fail and the innocent
legatees suffer in common with the guilty
s
. Direct decisions to the effect that a legacy
procured by undue influence may be omitted and the remainder of the instrument pro-
bated are meager; but several courts have by way of dicta approved such a procedure
9
.
A closely related question is whether the probate court has power to eliminate
from the instrument words put in by mistake. The English courts have repeatedly
held that the probate court may strike from the instrument words inserted by mistake
whose presence was unknown to the testator'
0
. These courts have said, however, that
if the testator read the will, or if it was read to him,, he must be taken to have been
familiar with the contents and to have intended the entire document to be his will.
Under no circumstances can the probate court add words to a will, for the statute re-
quires that a will be in writing and signed by the testator; but in striking words out
of a will inserted by mistake the court is merely finding that the testator signed as his
will the paper presented minus the words omitted from probate. The court is in no
sense changing the testator's will, but is merely excluding certain words from probate
because as to them there is no testamentary intent. Few American cases have directly
passed upon the propriety of striking out words mistakenly inserted, but the dicta in
several of the cases and such authorities as are available seem to be in accord with
the English decisions.' 1 There is language in the opinion in Cox v. Cox
1 2 
which seems
to indicate it to be the view of the Missouri court that words inserted by mistake may
be omitted from probate.
The cases in which a legatee obtains a legacy by fraud seem to be different on
principle from the cases of mistake and undue influence.
1 3 If there be undue influence,
the mind of the testator is so overmastered that another will is substituted for his
own; whereas if the will is procured by fraud the testator is a free agent but is deceived
into acting upon false data. If one legacy only is procured by fraud that legacy is
not entitled to probate; but inasmuch as the testator intended the entire instrument, in-
cluding the legacy obtained by fraud, to be his will, it seems difficult to say that he
intended to sign as his will the instrument minus the legacy. Thus if the principle
case had been one of fraud it might find more ready support because of the lack of
testamentary intent as to the rest of the will. In general, however, the cases have made
7. SCHsOOLER, WILLS, EXRS. & ADMS. (6th (1882); Goods of Oswald, L. R, 3 P. & D. 162
ed.) Sec. 259. (1874); Guardhouse v. Blackburn, L. R. I P.
8. Gott v. Dennis, 296 Mo. 66, 246 S. W. & D. 109 (1866); Goods of 
Duane, 2 S. W. & T.
218 (1922); Morris v. Stokes, sopra note 3; In R. 590 (1862).
re Wagner's estate, 289 Pa. 361, 137 At. 616 11. O'Connell v. Dow, 182 Mass. 541, 552,
(1927). 554, 66 N. E. 778 (1903); Sherwood v. 
Sher.
9. Harrison's Appeal; Eastis v. Montgomery; wood, 45 Wis. 
357 (1878).
Florey v. Florey; Lyons v. Campbell, all sopra 12. Supra note 5.
note 3. 13. In re Snowball's estate, 157 Cal. 301,
10. Morrell v. Morrell, L. R. 7 P. & D. 68 107 Pac. 598 (1910).
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no distinction in this regard between fraud and undue influence, and have allowed pro-
bate of the proffered instrument minus the legacy procured by fraud. 14
So much for the jurisdiction of the court in the probate proceeding. To what ex-
tent, if any, do different considerations apply in the suit to contest the will?
It has been generally regarded that the proceeding in the circuit court to contest a
will is in the nature of an appeal from the judgment of the probate court. The effect
is to transfer the whole matter to the circuit court for trial de novo, and to render
void the action of the probate court in relation to the will.i 5 Conceivably it might be
argued that the circuit court has jurisdiction to inquire merely whether the instrument
which the probate court found to be the last will of the testator is in fact the last will.
On this theory, if the circuit court found that the testator had testamentary intent, as to
part only of that instrument, it should sustain the contest as to the entire instrument.
But the question properly involved in the contest of a will is whether the instrument
produced is the will of the testator, which is the issue in the probate proceeding. No
case has been found suggesting that the circuit court passes upon an issue different
from that adjudicated by the probate court. The proper rule would seem to be that,
for the purposes of the particular case, the circuit court is converted into a court of
probate and that the proceeding is in effect one to probate the will in solemn form.' 6
Therefore, it would seem that in the suit to contest a will, the court should, un-
less some statute provides otherwise, have the power to omit words or legacies put in
by mistake or undue influence and to declare the remainder to be the will of the
testator.
The decision in the principal case was the result of a construction placed by the
court upon that portion of Section 525, R. 9. Mo. (1919) which provides that in a will
contest suit an issue shall be made up whether the writing produced be the will of the
testator or not. Previous Missouri cases had interpreted this statute to mean, that in
the will contest proceedings, the only issue was whether the writing produced was the
will of the testator, and the province of the jury was simply to determine, under the
instructions and evidence, whether or not the instrument was a valid will.17 But this
issue would seem to be nothing more than the common law issue of devisavit vel non,
namely, "is the instrument in question the last will of the testator," which has pre-
viously been considered as the issue before the court in the probate proceeding. A
number of states appear to have statutes similar to the Missouri statute. In some
of these jurisdictions this provision has been held to mean that the will must stand
or fall as an entirety, and undue influence affecting one legacy only invalidates the en-
14. See Lilly v. Tobbein, supra note 3, in otte, 156 Mo. 513, 57 S. NV. 281, 50 L. R. A.
which the Missouri court says. "Where a par- 787 (1900); Lilly v. Tobbein, supra note 3;
ticular clause has been inserted in the will Lamb v. Helm, 56 Mo. 420 (1874); Harris v.
by fraud or forgery, it may, in such suit, be Hays, 53 Mo. 90 (1873); ]Benoist v. Murrin, 48
rejected for the reason that it is no part of the Mo. 48, (1871).
will; but when a particular clause is found to 16. KELLY'S PROBATV GUIns (5th ed. 1926)
be a part of the will the whole must be pro- Sec. 60.
bated, and this, too, though the particular clause 17. Cox v. Cox, supra note 5; Tingley v.
can not be enforced." Cowgill, 48 Mo. 291 (1871); Benoist v. Mur-
15. Johnson v. Brewn, 277 Mo. 392, 210 S. rin, supra note 15.
W. 55 (1919); State ex rel Hamilton v. Guin.
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tire will.a8 In Ohio, however, which has a statute similar to the Missouri statute, the
courts have intimated that a part of the instrument may be rejected in a suit to con-
test the will and the remainder held valid and entitled to probate.1 9
The language in the prior Missouri cases interpreting the statute, to the effect
that the only issue is whether the instrument presented is the will of the testator, can
perhaps be taken to mean merely that the court will not inquire into the invalidity or
legality of the particular clauses of the will. 20 The statute does not expressly state
that the issue shall be whether the writing, in its entirety, is the will of the testator.
It would seem proper for the court to determine how much of the writing produced
spoke the will of the testator. It would seem therefore that the statute should not
limit the jurisdiction of the court or the scope of the inquiry, either in the probate
proceeding or in the suit to contest the will.
*Lowell L. Knipmeyer, LL.B. '32.
*1322 Commerce Bldg.
Kansas City, Missouri
LARCENY-CONSENT OF THE OWNER. State v. Perrin-
The manager of a wholesale house received, over the telephone, an order for
cigars, purporting to come from a certain drug store, the caller stating that he would
send a messenger for the same. The manager of the cigar company checked the order
by calling the drug store, and thereby ascertained that it was spurious. However, he
directed that the cigars be made up for delivery and that the package be addressed to
the drug store from which the order supposedly came. That having been done, when
one of the defendants called for the package, it was handed over to him in the usual
manner by the manager of the wholesale house, and the defendant signed a receipt
therefor. The defendant was arrested as he left the premises with the package. The
court held that the manager voluntarily delivered the package to the defendant, and
that this constituted a consent to the taking. The court stated further that where the
criminal design originates with the accused and the owner of the goods merely facilitates
its execution, that is not such legal consent as would negative a trespass. But to vol-
untarily hand over to a pretender, goods fraudulently ordered by him in the name
of another, knowing the order to be fictitious, is more than facilitation; it is a delivery
of the property atid a consent to the taking.
18. In California several cases held that Code
provisions would not permit a portion of a will
to be probated and the rest denied probate, and
in consequence a will could not be invalidated
against one legatee and upheld as to the others.
In re Lavinburg's estate, 161 Cal. 536, 119 Pac.
915 (1911); In re Phorr's estate, 144 Cal. 121, 77
Pac. 825 (1904); In the matter of Freud, 73
Cal. 555, 15 Pac. 135 (1887). Contra: (As to
legacies obtained by fraud) In re Carson's
estate, 184 Cal. 437, 194 Pac. 5 (1920). In Il-
linois it is assumed rather than actually decided
that the invalidity of one portion of the will
would result in the invalidity of the entire will.
Teter v. Spooner, 279 Il1. 39, 116 N. t. 673
(1917); Gum v. Reep, 275 Il. 503, 114 N. E.
271 (1916); Veston v. Tewfel, 213 Il1. 291, 72
N. 9. 908 (1904). BIut in Snyder v. Steele, 304
I1. 387, 136 N. E. 649, 28 A. L. R. 1 (1922)
the question was specifically decided by the
Illinois Supreme Court who said: "Under the
statute the issue before the jury is whether or
not the purported will is the will of the testator,
and the question is as to the validity of the will
as a whole. Testimony which defeats one de-
fendant, one devisee, or one legatee, defeats
all, and a judgment against one is necessarily
a judgment aganist all".
19. Mears v. Mears, 15 Ohio St. 90 (1864);
Johnson v. Ramsey, 18 Ohio App. 321 (1923).
20. Cox v. Cox, supra note 5.
1. 229 S. W. 54 (Mo. 1927).
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Larceny at the common law was defined as a taking, stealing, and asportation of
the goods of another.2 The term taking was loosely construed to imply a trespass,
which was a necessary element of the offense. The taking must be against the will
of the owner, or, to state the same proposition in different words, there can be
no trespass with the contest of the owner, and hence there can be no larceny with the
owner of the goods concurring in the taking.
3 The law of larceny in its subsequent
development remains unchanged, and a taking without the consent of the owner is still
essential to the consummation of the offense.
4 In Missouri the statute dealing with
this crime is but declaratory of the common law,
5 
and the cases in this state are in
accord therewith in holding that the taking, in order to constitute larceny, must be
against the will of the owner, and that the consent of the owner vitiates the trespass so
that there can be no larceny."
Thus having determined that the non-consent of the owner is a necessary part of
the offense of larceny, it is next important to determine what consent is, and when it
is such as will render a trespass impossible. The cases are in accord to the effect that
there is no larceny where the owner personally, or through an agent, solicits the tak-
ing of which he complains.7 No doubt this is a sound principle in the law, since such
conduct on the part of the owner amounts to, or at least comes dangerously near to,
entrapment, which the courts have perhaps rightfully condemned. Hence, these cases
are probably justifiable both on the basis that historically larceny was regarded as a
crime of violence tending to resistance, retaliation and consequent breaches of the
peace, and also on the basis that the purpose of prevention of crime by punishment is
not well served where the moving party to the prosecution has instigated the act and
abetted its commission. On the other hand, if the original criminal intent arose in
the accused and the intended victim does not actually urge him on to the commission
of the crime, the mere fact that he facilitates the execution of the scheme, or that his
agents appear to cooperate in its execution, will be no defense to the accused.
8 But
it is at this point that the cases make the distinction exemplified in the principal case.
The courts advance the proposition that where there is actual delivery by the owner
or his authorized agent, that such delivery exceeds mere facilitation and amounts to
consent. The case of Regina v. Lawence
0 
clearly illustrates the principle in ques-
tion and vividly demonstrates the fine differentiation made in the cases. In that case
the court held that where the agent, in connivance with the owner of the goods, 
de-
livered them into the prisoner's hands, the indictment for larceny could not be sustained,
2. 9 Laws of Eng. 628-636.
3. Supra, note 2, see. 1285.
4. Bishop on Criminal Law, Vol. II, sec. 881.
5. Sec. 4064 R. S. of Mo. 1929.
6. State v. Gray, 37 Mo. 463 (1865); State
v. Storts, 138 Mo. 127 (1897); State v. West,
157 Mo. 309 (1900); State v. Waller, 174 Mo.
518 (1903)- State v. Waghalter, 177 Mo. 676
(1903); State v. James, 133 Mo. App. 300
(1908); State v. Court, 225 Mo. 615 (1910);
State v. Loeb, 190 S. W. 299, 16 Law Series,
34 (Mo. 1910); Topelewski v. State, 109 N. W.
1037 (Wis. 1910); 7 L. R. A. (ns) 756.
7. State v. Hayes; State v. Waghalter; State
v. Loeb, supra note 6. Also see Conner v.
People. 18 Colo. 373 (1893); 25 L. R. A. 341.
8. State v. West, supra note 6; State v. Dun-
can, 8 Rob. (La.) 562 (1844); Alexander v
State, 12 Tex. 540 (1854); Lowe v. State, 4-
Fla. 449 (1902); People v, Smith, 251 Ill. 18:
(1911).
9. State v. Loeb, supra note 6; Regina v
Lawrence, 4 Cox C. C. 438 (1850); Love v
People, 43 N. E. 710 (Ill. 1896); Topelewksi v
State, supra note 6; Edmonson v. State, 89 S
E. 189 (Ga. 1916).
10. Supra note 9. Here the prisoner applie(
to the clerk of the prosecutor to procure him
deed which was in the possession of the latter
In connivance with the master the clerk deliver
ed the deed to The prisoner. The court held tha
the indictment for larceny could not he sus
tained because the delivery by the agent amount
ed to the consent of the owner.
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but, by way of dictum, it is asserted that where he merely placed the goods where they
were easily accessible to the defendant, who took them, that that was not consent, and
that the defendant was guilty of larceny. The case of State v. Loeb"1 presents a slight-
ly different perspective on the question of delivery and consent. In that case there was
no actual manual delivery. A prisoner contractor, after learning that some of the
goods from the prison factory had been fraudulently billed out by a convict employee,
permitted them to be shipped as consigned for the purpose of apprehending the one
that was receiving them. The court held that they thereby consented to the taking and
that the transaction was therefore divested of the elements necessary to constitute
larceny. This seems to be the logical result of the proposition that no prosecution for
larceny can be predicated on a taking with the consent of the owner. The distinction
between purposely exposing the property to the taker or otherwise facilitating the
taking, and where there is actual delivery seems purely arbitrary and highly technical,
because it seems that the consent of the owner is present in both instances. What dif-
ference should it make that in the latter case it is manifested by actual delivery? Yet
such a distinction seems to be firmly imbedded in the law of larceny.
In the case of State v. Perrin both justice and public policy would seem to require
the amercement of the defendant since, he has done everything in his power to steal
the property of the cigar company. But in view of the state of the law today, no
doubt the decision of the court in this case is sound, although it has resulted in an ap-
parent miscarriage of justice since the defendant went unpunished. Thus having de-
termined that the defendant cannot be properly indicted for larceny, we are next
concerned with the question of whether he is quilty of any offense. It is submitted
that the defendant is quilty at least of an indictable criminal attempt. At the common
law it was a misdemeanor to attempt to obtain property by false pretenses, and where
the false pretenses were discovered prior to the delivery such was the offense. It
makes no difference that for some reason beyond the control of the defendant the
completed crime was an impossibility.12 Likewise a statute in Missouri prescribes that
any person who shall attempt to commit an offense prohibited by law, and in such at-
tempt shall do any act toward the commission of such offense, but shall fail in the per-
petration thereof, shall be punished as follows ...... .13 An attempt is an overt act
directly related to the commission of the crime, and which is accompanied by the
criminal intent to perpetrate the same.' 4 In the case at hand the defendant has done
everything in his power to consummate the offense, but the completed crime cannot
reach fruition because of the plaintiff's discovery of the defendant's artifice; and as
already pointed out, the offense cannot be larceny because, after the discovery of the
plot, the owner manually delivered the goods, and this is held to amount to a consent to
the taking. Therefore it seems that the defendant is guilty of a criminal attempt.15
At least it would seem that the defendant should be indictable for a conspiracy to
commit the crime. At the common law where two persons conspired together to ob-
tain the property of another in such a manner, such a conspiracy was an indictable mis-
demeanor. 10 By statute in this state it is provided that if two or more persons shall
agree, conspire, combine, or confederate ..... to cheat and defraud any person of any
11. Supra note 6. idson, 172 Mo. App. 356 (1912); State v. Lourie,
12. 9 Laws of ing. 703. 12 S. W. (2d) 43 (Mo. 1928).
13. R. S. of Mo. 1929, sec. 4442. 15. Regina v. Cheeseman, 9 Cox C. C. 100.
14. Bishop on Criminal Law, Vol. I, sec. 729;
State v. Wes. 35 Mo. 500 (1865); State * 16. 9 Laws of Eng. 708; Bishop on Criminal
i 3Saw, Vol. II, sec. 198.Williams. 30 Alo. App. 43 (1890) ; State v. Dav-
THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
property by any means, which, if executed, would amount to a cheat, or to obtaining
money or property under false pretenses ..... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemean-
or.17 Here Perrin and the other defendants have conspired to obtain a quantity of cigars
by representing themselves to be a certain drug store, and they have done all in their
power to carry their plans to completion. Certainly that amounts to a criminal con-
spiracy within the meaning of the statute.
Thus we see that in State v. Perrin the indictment charging the defendant with
larceny was improperly brought, since the delivery of the goods amounted to a con-
sent to the taking, and prevented the act from being larceny. However where there
is no manual delivery the present trend of the law is to the effect that it would be
larceny. No doubt the element of non-consent is essential, but where that consent
is for the purpose of apprehending the taker it is suggeste$ that that consent should
not be operative to prevent the act from being larceny. The court in a Texas case-'
advanced the proposition as a matter of dictum that the owner of the goods in such
cases only consented to the taking in so far as was necessary to apprehend the taker.
The soundness of such a proposition is questionable since the consent of the owner is
given regardless of the motivating circumstances for that consent. On the other
hand it would seem that in such cases as State v. Perrin, where the criminal intent
originates with the defendant, and the owner consents to the taking only to apprehend
him therein, that there should be some statutory provision whereby the defendant might
be indictable for larceny regardless of the doctrine of consent, which is so deeply
rooted in the criminal law.
*Harold M. Gutekunst, LL.B. '34.
*Moberly, Missouri
MAY A MOTHER SUE HER MINOR CHILD IN TORT. Wells v. Wells et al.1
This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have beenr
sustained as the result of negligence of the defendants. The plaintiff is the mother
of both defendants. One of the defendants, Russell T. Wells, was a minor, seventeen
years of age at the time of the trial, and living with his father and mother. He was
driving the car at the time the injury occurred, with the permission and under the
supervision of his brother, the owner of the car, who was 27 years of age. The Kansas
City Court of Appeals held that a mother might sue her minor child in tort, and af-
firmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The question involved in this case is rather new, having been passed on in only
three very late decisions. 2 However, a very similar situation, that of a child suing
the parent in tort has often been before the courts, and there is quite extensive author-
ity upon that question. The great and overwhelming number of the cases have held'
17. R. S. of Mo. 1929, sec. 4243. 1. 48 S. W. (2d) 109 (Mo. App. 1932).
2. Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152
18. Jarrott v. State, I S. W. (2d) (Tex. Atl. 498 (1930); Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 246 N.
1928). Y. Supp. 565 (1930); and Wells v. Wells, supra,
note 1.
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that a child may not sue its parent in tort.3 A few cases, notably Lusk v. Lusk,4 Dun-
lap v. Dunlap,5 and Fidelity & Caustalty Co. v. Marchard, 1 have held otherwise. As
can be seen from these authorities the rule in this country is very definitely crystalized,
with the exception of Lusk v. Lusk7 and Dunlap v. Dunlap,8 that a minor child may
not sue its parent in tort. These courts that have held that a parent may not sue a minor
child in tort have based their decisions entirely upon the ruling that a minor child may
not sue the parent in tort. They reason that if the child cannot sue the parent then the
converse is also true and the parent may not sue the child.9 But does that necessarily
follow, especially when there is great doubt in the minds of many, that the reasons
behind the rule that a child cannot sue its parent, are no longer present in our modern
society, with greatly changed family ideals and accident liability insurance. In order
to determine this question it is necessary to examine those reasons and determine
whether, if they should have any weight at all, we should go so far as to say that they
should also apply in the situation where the child is being sued by the parent.
Seven reasons have been advanced by the courts in support of the doctrine that
a child has no cause of action for a personal injury inflicted by the parent and they
are as follows :10
(1) Danger of fraud.1 1 This reason is only applicable in a case where the in-
jured minor does not sue until he becomes of age. Those courts presenting that argu-
3. Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145
At. 753 (1929); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App.
566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924); Miller v. Pelzer, 153
Minn. 375, 199 N. W. 97 (1924); Hewlett v.
George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Gold-
stein v. Goldstein, 4 N. J. Misc. 711, 134 Atl.
184 (1926); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N. Y.
626, 162 N. E. 551 (1928); Small v. Morrison,
185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923); Matarese v.
Matajese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 Ati. 198 (1925); Mc-
Kelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W.
664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79
Pac. 788 (1905); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N. W. 787 (1927); Zutter v. O'Connell, 200
Wis. 601, 229 N. W. 74 (1930). See also a furth-
er collection of the cases in ( . ) 31 A. L. R.
1157; (1926) 52 A. I. R. 1123; and (1930) 71
A. L. R. 1071. See McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 Har.
L. Rev. 1030; and Notes in (1930) 44 Har. L.
Rev. 135; (1930) B. U. L. Rev. 584; (1930)
Tenn. L. 'Rev. 62; (1930) 6 Wis. L. Rev. 106;
(1930) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 126; (1931) 31 Col. L,
Rev. 507; (1931) 16 Corn. L. Q. 386; and
(1930) 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 80. See also,
Burdick, The Law of Torts, (4th ed. 1926)
162, 163.
4. 166 S. E. 538 (W. Va. 1932); (1933) 1
Duke B. A. Jour. 51; (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev.
360.
5. 150 At. 905 (N. H. 1930).
6. 4 D. L. R. 157 (1924).
7. Supra, note 4.
8. Supra, note 5.
9. Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, supra, note 2.
There the court said: "The broad rule of the
common law, that a minor child could not re-
cover against its parents for injuries received
through the latter's tort, was based upon grounds
of public policy, and for the reason that to
hold otherwise would tend to destroy the fam-
ily relationship: if the parental act were crim-
inal, resort could be had to the Penal law. It
would be easy to state situations where absolute
adherence to this rule in negligence cases might
result in a situation which would be little less
than barbarous. Assume that a father of am-
ple means had, through his negligence, maimed
for life his son, destroyed for life his earning
power, and that, after the child so maimed had
reached maturity, the father disposed of all his
property by will without making provision for
his maimed son; there would be a case where
the resort to public policy would work against
a sound public policy; and it is possible that, out
of consideration of such an instance and of the
cbanged conditions arising out of the use of
automobiles, the Court of Appeals gave suclr
hesitant support to the old common law rule.
In any event the decision goes no farther thaii
to hold that a minor unemancipated child may
not maintain an action grounded in negligence
to recover damages against his parent. It fol-
lows that the converse of the rule must also be
true-that a parent may not maintain an action
against an unemancipated child to recover dam-
ages for injuries caused to him by the negli-
gence of the child."
10. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Do-
meostic Relations, supra, note 3.
11. Treschman v. Tresehman, 28 Id. App.
206, 61 N. E. 577 (1901).
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ment fear, because of the lapse of time in bringing the suit, that if the minor was al
lowed to sue he might possibly make up his case. The reasoning does not seem to b(
strong.1 2 Even if it has some weight where the child is suing the parent, it is impos.
sible to see how it could apply where the parent is suing the child.
(2) Possibility of succession. 1 3 The courts presenting this argument reason i
the child recovers from the parent, that the parent will take from the child, if th(
child dies, and therefore such a suit would be useless. The same argument would als(
apply where the parent is suing the child. But is that possibility sufficient to den3
either the parent or the child the enforcement of one of their primary rights? It seem!
that in making such an argument that the court is endeavoring only to justify an end
(3) Family exchequer.' 4 This reasoning here is if the child recovers from the
parent then the family fund which is for the benefit of all is depleted for the benefil
of one. However, there may be no others.' 5 Anyway, would such a reason apply wherc
the parent is suing the child?(4) Analogy to actions between husband and wife. 16 This reason, however, i,
entirely inapplicable in either situation because the relationship between parent and
child is not like that between husband and wife.' 7
(5) Domestic tranquility.' This is possibly the strongest contention in favor
of the well established rule. However, the only fault to be found with it is if there
has been an action giving grounds for a suit, then that tranquility has already been
surely disturbed. And also, it must be remembered, where the parent is suing a
minor child or even where the child is suing the parent, the one sued may be protected
by accident liability insurance, and, therefore, a recovery will not disturb the tran-
quility of the family.' 9
(6) Domestic government. 20 Under present day conditions, while it may remain
in theory it is in reality nothing more than a fiction.
(7) Parental discipline and control. 21 This reason is probably sound enough
from the standpoint of the child suing the parent; but how could the fact that the par-
ent is suing the child affect the parents discipline and control over that child.
While it cannot be said that the reasons back of the common law rule do not exist
today, yet there is much room for argument that they are not as important as they
formerly were. And if that is the case, why should we necessarily have to say, since
the child cannot sue the parent, that the converse is also true and the parent cannot sue
the child, when the majority of the reasons back of the former rule do not fit when
applied to the latter.
But admitting that the same rule should apply in both situations, and admitting
that the reasons behind the common law rule are justifiable, should that rule be ap-
plied in all cases, or are there certain situations where we may and should make an
exception? It seems that such an exception may well be made in a case where the
child is protected by insurance, or where he may be considered as acting as an agent
for some other person. It seems that the Missouri court in Wells v. Wells2 2 had both
of these situations in mind.
12. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 5. N. Schneider, supra note 2.
13. Roller v. Roller, sifpra note 3. 19. Dunlap v. Dunlap, srfpra note 5; Lusk
14. Ibid. v. Lusk, supra note 4.
15. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 5. 20. Matarese v. Matarese, supra note 3.
16. Roller v. Roller, supra note 3. 21. Wick v. Wick, suPra note 3.
17. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra note 5. 22. Supra, note 1.
1. Wick v. Wick, supra note 3; Schneider
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Where the child is protected by liability insurance it seems there that all the rea-
sons behind the well established rule fail. The court in Dunlap v. Dunlap23 held the
old rule inapplicable as did the court in Lusk v. Lusk 24 and allowed a recovery by the
child where the parent was protected by insurance. But most courts have held that the
fact that there is insurance should make no difference. They proceed upon the assump-
tion that the insurance company should not be liable unless the insured would be liable. 5
The same view is followed by the courts in analogous situations such as husband and
wife, and servant and principal. -0 However, it seems they overlook the fact that the one
being sued is protected by doctrines which are not applicable where that party is pro-
tected by insurance.
In the instant case there is also the question of agency. The court makes the
statement that "notwithstanding the fact that Russell T. Wells was a minor, he could
act as the agent of his brother in operating the automobile." Now the reasons that
exist where the child is a minor are no longer present where the child is an adult. It
has been held in California 27 and Mississippi2 8 that a parent might bring an action
against an adult child in tort. The court in the instant case intimated that the minor
child is acting as the agent of his adult brother, which fact probably had great weight
in allowing a recovery.
*Wallace Clifton Banta, LL.B. '33.
*Charleston, Missouri
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR AGAINST
ONE OF TWO JOINT TORT FEASORS. Zilcher v. St. Louis Public Service Co.1
This case is a suit for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in a collison be-
tween the defendant's street-car and a motor truck, the owner of which was also join-
ed as defendant. The plaintiff alleged specific acts of negligence against the owner of
the truck, and general negligendc against the street-car company. The plaintiff then
called the motorman and the truck driver as witnesses, on the assumption that the
jury must believe one; and if the jury believed the motorman, then the plaintiff would
recover from the truck company; and if the jury believed the truck driver, then the
plaintiff would recover from the street-car company. The jury found for the truck
company, but assessed damages against the street-car company which now appeals.
The Supreme Court held for affirmance, stating that res ipsa loquitur was applicable.
However, the statement by the court can only be considered dictum. The ques-
tion is not raised on the pleadings, since a general allegation of negligence is sufficient
unless tested by a motion to make specific. Nor was the question raised on the suf-
ficiency of the evidence, since the jury received proof of negligence by the defendant
23. Supra, note 5. (1929) 3 S. Cal. L. Rev. 38; contra (1933) 27
24. Supra, note 4. Ill. L. Rev. 955; Keller v. Industrial Commis-
25. Small v. Morrison, supra note 3; Elias sion, 350 Ill. 390, 183 N. E. 237 (1932).
v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N. W. 88, 52 27. Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood. 114 Cal. A.
A. L. R. 1118 (1926). 538, 300 Pa. 144 (1931).
26. Notes (1930) 28 M{ich. L. Rev. 774; 28. NVeyen v. NVeyen, 139 So. 608 (Miss.
(1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 257; Crane, Personal 1932).
Injuries to Occupants of the Family Car
THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
and hence were not necessarily forced to rely upon the presumption of negligence aris-
ing from the application of res ipsa loquitur. It is, therefore, necessary to examine
other cases in order to determine the law in Missouri on this proposition.
There are two questions presented by the principal case in connection with the ap-
plication of res ipsa loquitur: (1) whether a presumption under the doctrine may arise
as a matter of evidence when there are two tort-feasors, neither having exclusive con-
trol and management of the agencies causing the accident; (2) whether, conceding the
first point, the form of the pleadings makes the doctrine unavailable to the plaintiff.
As to the first question, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence making a prima facie
showing of negligence against the defendant, arising from the fact of the collision and
the attendant circumstances. It apparently has its justification upon these bases: (1)
it is reasonable to presume that the defendant has been negligent, since the situation
must be such that no accident would ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (2)
it is necessary to give this aid to the plaintiff, since he usually has no knowledge or
means of getting information concerning the causes or attendant circumstances of the
accident, while the defendant is usually in a position to know the facts of the situation.
It is well settled that res ipsa loquitur applies to actions for personal injuries
brought by a passenger against a carrier, where the carrier is in sole control and man-
agement of the agency or agencies causing the accident. But a different situation is
presented in the principal case, since the carrier is not in sole control and management.
Whether this factor is sufficient to make the doctrine inapplicable is the subject of the
present inquiry. In this situation, many jurisdictions,2 in addition to Missouri, hold
that res ipsa loquitur remains applicable. These courts emphasize the basis of the
doctrine referred to, namely, that the plaintiff has no means of getting knowledge or
information as to just what caused the accident.3 The rule is established in Missouri
by many decisions.4 And the same result was reached upon facts identical to those
in the principal case, in Gibson v. Wells,5 and in Cecil v. Wells.r
1. 59 S. W. (2d) 654 (Mo. 1933).
2. Biddle v. Riley, 118 Ark, 206, 176 S. W.
134 (1915); Robinson v. MeAlister, 13 Pac.
(2d) 926 (Cal. 1932); Housel v. Pac. Electric
Ry. Co., 167 Cal. 245, 139 Pac. 73 (1914).
The California decisions attempt to distinguish
the situations here presented from the one in
Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., 134 Cal. 549, 66
Pac. 787 (1901), 55 A. L. R. 608, where the
dictum was opposed to the present California
view. Interstate State Lines v. Aylers, 42 F.
(2d) 611 (C. C. A. Sth, 1930); Crozier v.
Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 228 N. W. 320
(1929); Central Passenger Ry. Co. v. Kuhn, 86
Ky. 578, 6 S. W. 441 (1888); Dawson v. Toye
Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 15 La. App. 326, 131 So.
716 (1931); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R.
Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504 (1922), 25
A. L. R. 685, reversed what was previously stated
to be the prevailing rule in New York, and re-
turned to the rule of Loundown v. Eighth Ave.
R. Co., 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988 (1900);
Hodge v. Sycamore Coal Co., 82 W. Va. 106,
95 S. E. 808 (1918).
3. This is well pointed out in Plumb v
Richmond Light & R. Co., supra note 2.
4. Stauffer v. Met. R. R., 243 Mo. 305, 14;
S. W. 1032 (1912) (leading case); Chlanda v
St. Louis Transit Co., 213 Mo. 244, 112 S. W
249 (1908); Olsen v. Citizens R. R. Co., 152 Mo
426, 54 S. W. 470 (1899); Clarke v. Chi. & A. R
Co., 127 Mo. 197, 29 S. W. 1013 (1895); Peter
v. Matthews-Thomas Freight & Express Co. el
al., 51 S. W. (2d) 139 (Mo. App. 1932); Cecil
v. Wells, 214 Mo. App. 193, 259 S. W. 844
(1924); Gibson v. Wells, 258 S. W. 1 (Mo. App
1924) (leading case); Moran v. K. C. R. R. Co.
232 S. W. 111 (Mo. App. 1921); Yates v,
United R. R., 222 S. W. 1034 (Mo. App. 1920).
Nagel v. United Ry. of St. Louis, 169 Mo. App
284, 152 S. W. 621 (1912); Augustus v. Chi
& R. I. R. R. Co., 153 Mo. App. 572, 134 S
W. 22 (1911); Williamson v. St. Louis & M. R
R. Co., 133 Mo. App. 375, 113 S. W. 23.
(1908).
5. Supra, note 4.
6. Supra, note 4.
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But there are numerous jurisdictions taking the opposite position. 7 This point
of view is well expressed in the leading case of Chicago City Ry. v. Rood.8 The court
there said that the presumption of negligence under res ipsa loquitur arises not from
the accident itself but from the attendant circumstances. Where the defendant has
sole control and management, there is a reasonable presumption that the defendant was
negligent based on common human experience. But where there is no sole control and
management, the facts are equally consistent with a theory of unavoidable accident or
negligence by a third party as with a theory of negligence by the defendant. Further,
no longer is the defendant's knowledge necessarily better than that of the plaintiff.
It is, therefore, improper to throw the burden of proof on the defendant.9
It would seem that the position of the Rood case, which is contra to that taken by
the Missouri courts, represents the better position. As pointed out above, res ipsa
loquitur rests upon two bases. Missouri and other jurisdictions emphasize that of con-
venience to the plaintiff. But no rule of law can stand solely on the ground that it
aids one of the parties. A presumption can only be raised because it is an extremely
strong, if not close to a necessary, inference. Such inference can be drawn where the
defendant is in sole control and management, and where accidents of this nature do not
ordinarily happen unless he has been negligent. But as pointed out by the Rood case,
that inference is all but destroyed when the defendant does not have sole control and
management. Moreover, in addition to the fact that the convenience of the plaintiff
is not supported by a reasonable inference of negligence, there is another reason for not
allowing the plaintiff the advantage of the doctrine. Although it is true that the plain-
tiff does not have knowledge of the facts, it is also true that the defendant does not
necessarily have any better means for knowing the facts since he did not have exclu-
sive control of the situation and, therefore, cannot be said reasonably to know facts pos-
sibly pertaining wholly to acts and omissions of a stranger, the other defendant. There-
fore, there is a close approximation to equality of convenience; and in such case, the
plaintiff as the moving party should carry the burden of proof.
But assuming the Missouri rule in reference to the general application of res ipsa
loquitur to the situation of the principal case, do the pleadings make the doctrine un-
available?
It is well settled in Missouri that if the plaintiff pleads specific acts of negligence,
he is confined to proof of those allegations and can not resort to the
7. Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., supra note 2;
Yellow Cab Co. v. Hodgson et al, 14 Pac. (2d)
1081 (Colo. 1932), 83 A. L. R. 1156 (a recent
case treated by the Colorado court as a matter
of first impression); Chicago City Ry. v. Rood,
163 111. 477, 45 N. E. 238 (1896) (leading case);
Union Traction Co. v. Alstadt, 195 Ind. 389, 143
N. E. 879 (1924); Elliot v. Brooklyn Heights
R. Co., 127 App. Div. 300, 111 N. Y. Supp. 358
(1908) (stating a rule Contra to that now said
to prevail in New York, supra note 2.); Cox v.
Scott, 104 N. J. L. 371, 140 At. 390 (1928);
Kurts v. Pa. Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 179, 90
Ad. 525 (1914); Fagan v. R. I. Co., 27 R. L 51,
60 Atl. 672 (1905); Weston v. Hillyer, 159 S.
E. 390 (S. Car. 1931); Riggsby v. Tritton, 129
S. E. 493 (Va. 1925); Hawkins v. Front St.
Cable Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28 Pac. 1021 (1892).
8. Supra, note 7.
9. There is a third view set forth by a few
courts including Massachusetts and Michigan.
By this view, the fact of management and con-
trol is only a feature of the collision, the nature
of which determines the application of res ipsa
I,'quilur thereto. It seems to be the settled law
in Michigan that the burden of proving neg-
ligence rests on the plaintiff throughout, and
that an inference of negligence cannot be drawn
from the mere fact of the accident itself (as is
done under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitttr);
but if the accident is attended by unusual cir-
cumstances of such a nature that the accident
could not well have happened if the defendant
had been in the exercise of due care, then those
circumstances may justify an inference of neg-
ligence. Thurston v. Detroit United Ry. Co.,
137 Mich. 231, 100 N. W. 395 (1904).
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presumption arising from res ipsa loquitur. This is on the theory that the plain-
tiff has evidenced a knowledge of the facts and, therefore, does not need the aid of the
presumption. 1° So if, in the principal case, the plaintiff had pleaded specific acts of
negligence against the street-car company, res ipsa loquitur would have become un-
available. The question now arises, whether the pleading of specific acts of negligence
against the motor truck company (one joint tort feasor) in the principal case will have
the same effect as if pleaded against the street-car company (the other joint tort
feasor).
Upon this point, the principal case says: "A plaintiff should not be compelled to
confine his action to one tort-feasor only in order to be accorded the rights which the
law gives him. The negligent acts of each defendant in order to make a joint liability,
must of course, be concurrent and contribute to the plaintiff's injury, but they need not
be, and generally are not, identical. The proof of one may be quite different from the
proof of the other." In the cases of Gibson v. Wells"l and Cecil v. Wells,12 the plead-
ings were in the same form as in the principal case. Although in those cases the court
did not discuss the question from the viewpoint of pleading, apparently the court felt
that the form of the pleadings presented no obstacle, since the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was applied,1 3
The view of the principal case in this respect seems sound. It seems that each
count in the principal case should be treated separately and the doctrine should not be
waived as to the count wherein the charge is general, since each count constitutes a
separate cause of action against separate defendants.
This view ,is also supported by other reasoning. The allegations of the plaintiff
against the truck company have not the dignity of official pleadings against the street-
car company. The only use to which these allegations may be put is as evidence against
the street-car company on the theory that they show a position inconsistent with the
one the plaintiff now takes and, therefore, constitutes an admission. The rule in Mis-
souri, laid down by the leading case of Price v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.,14 and follow-
ed by the succeeding cases, is that an unsuccessful effort by the plaintiff to prove speci-
fic negligence by introduction of evidence does not make the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
fur unavailable to the plaintiff. Since the pleadings by the plaintiff against the truck
company are no more than evidence in the cause against the street-car company, the
doctrine is therefore still available to the plaintiff.
It is -submitted that the facts do not warrant the application of res ipsa loquitur to
the principal case, although such application undoubtedly follows the Missouri decisions
and substantial authority in other jurisdictions. But it is further submitted that if the
doctrine is said to be applicable to this situation, then the rule of the principal case is




10. (1928) 40 U. o Mo. Flull. Law Ser. 41. 13. Peters v. Matthews-Thomas Freight &
11. Supra, note 4. Express Co. et al, supra, note 4.
12. Supra, note 4. 14. 220 Mo. 435, 119 S. NV. 932 (1909).
